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Abstract
Based on two strands of theoretical research, this paper provides new evidence
on how fares are jointly affected by in-flight seat availability and purchasing date.
As capacity-driven theories predict, it emerges that fares monotonically and substantially increase with the flights occupancy rate. Moreover, as suggested in the literature
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profile, where discounts are preceded by periods of relatively higher fares. Finally, the
intervention of yield management analysts appears to play a substantial role.
JEL Classification: D22, L11, L93.
Keywords: Pricing policy, Panel Data, Ryanair, Yield Management.

∗

We wish to thank seminar participants at Texas A&M University, Tilburg University, London City
University, University of Nottingham, and at the 2010 EARIE conference in Instabul for their comments.
Thanks to Maksim Belitski, Makoto Watanabe and Chris Wilson for their feedback. The responsibility for
the arguments and results expressed in this paper is entirely ours. Piga gratefully acknowledges financial
support from the Leverhulme Trust Research Fellowship Programme.
†
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Italy; and CERTeT, Università Bocconi, Roentgen 1, 20136 Milan, Italy; telephone +39 0165 066 723; fax:
+39 0165 066 748. E-mail: m.alderighi@univda.it.

1

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2012

1

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 665 [2012]

1

Introduction

Yield management (henceforth, YM) refers to a broad set of techniques that are profitably
used by such companies as airlines, hotels, car retails, cruise shipping, etc., to implement
a price discrimination policy when customers are heterogeneous, demand is uncertain and
capacity is hardly modifiable. In its simplest formulation, it entails a trade-off between
accepting now a booking request at a low price or refusing it to leave room tomorrow for
a potential customer willing to pay a higher price (Weatherford and Bodily, 1992; McGill
and Van Ryzin, 1999).
In the airline sector, YM implementation usually requires that seats are grouped into
different booking classes, each having a definite fare and, in most cases, specific restrictions
(e.g., ticket refunding, advance purchase restrictions, valid travel days, or stay restrictions).
YM activity, in practice, consists in setting fares and/or managing the number of seats
allocated to each class. Although YM operations are heavily computerized, the human
intervention (carried out by a “yield manager” or “analyst”) still remains very important.
It may occur when the observed sales are not aligned to the forecasted ones, or be due to
a rapid change in market conditions such as an unexpected peak demand or a strategic
action of rivals. In economic terms, YM can be interpreted as a very sophisticated way
to implement pricing policies, which may produce a wide range of fares even for the same
flight, so that two passengers sitting next to each other are likely to have paid different
prices for their tickets.1
This paper aims at providing new evidence on the sources of such a difference by using
an original database combining detailed information on fares and seat availability obtained
from the website of Europe’s largest Low-Cost airline (henceforth, LCA), Ryanair. The
relatively simple pricing behaviour of a LCA helps us to identify the combined impact on
fares of both in-flight seat availability and the time separating the purchase from the departure date. This, in turn, allows us to provide a test for the predictions of two theoretical
strands of research on airline pricing: the capacity-driven and the time-driven approach,
respectively.2
1

In Borenstein and Rose (1994), the expected difference in fares between two random passengers on a
given flight is on average 36% of the airline’s average ticket fare; this percentage increases to 44% in Gerardi
and Shapiro (2009) and to 66% in Gaggero and Piga (2011).
2
Previous studies on pricing behaviour in the U.S. Airlines industry have used different cohorts of the
same database, i.e., the Databank of the U.S.A. Department of Transportation’s Origin and Destination
Survey, which is a 10 percent yearly random sample of all tickets that originate in the United States on U.S.
carriers (Borenstein, 1989; Kim and Singal, 1993; Evans and Kessides, 1993, 1994; Borenstein and Rose,
1994; Lederman, 2008; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009). None of these studies addresses the issues of this paper.
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Dana (1999a) provides a theoretical model that addresses the link between fares and
seat availability. The basic idea is that the optimal fare is given by a constant mark-up over
the capacity cost. Because the shadow cost of a capacity unit increases as the probability
of selling a ticket decreases, the pricing profile increases with aircraft capacity utilization.
In other words, intra-firm dispersion arises not because an airline is trying to segment
its market, but because demand is uncertain, and the probability of selling an extra seat
decreases with in-flight seat utilization. In equilibrium, the airline defines a fare distribution
where the cheapest fares are assigned to seats with the highest probability of sale and the
highest fares are associated to seats that are seldom occupied.3
In this paper, we provide a direct test of the relevance of the capacity-driven approach,
i.e., of the extent by which fares increase with capacity utilization. A main practical
difficulty in carrying out this test is the availability of data on capacity utilization at the time
a fare is offered on an airline reservation system. Another complication, usually associated
with fares by full service airlines, may arise because different booking classes, each with a
different set of restrictions and fares, may be simultaneously available to travellers at a given
point in time, thus making it necessary to account for all ticket characteristics (Stavins,
2001). A notable innovation in this study is the possibility to combine fares with the number
of seats available at the time the fare was retrieved from the airline’s website. Moreover,
using data from Ryanair rules out any difference in seats’ characteristics, because the airline
imposes the same set of restrictions on all its fares. Furthermore, by using flight fixed-effect
panel data techniques, where the temporal dimension is obtained by tracking a flight’s
fares and seat availability over a 70-day period, we also control for possible unobserved
heterogeneity across flights. Our estimates indicate that, on average, an extra sold seat
induces an increase of about 2.6% in offered fares. This effect increases in the sample of
flights that: i) realized a high load factor early during the booking period; ii) operate in less
competitive routes; iii) are scheduled in periods of higher demand, e.g., during Summer.
These results show the relevant role played by a capacity-driven approach to airline pricing
in explaining airline price dispersion.
The previous evidence on this issue is rather mixed. On the one hand, Puller et al.
(2009) find only modest support for the capacity-driven approach, and illustrate that much
of the fare variation may be associated with second-degree price discrimination (i.e. ticket
characteristics). On the other, Escobari and Gan (2007) find that price quotes are on average higher in fully occupied flights, as predicted by the capacity-driven approach. However,
3

Dana (1999a), which assumes homogeneous seats, shows that the equilibrium distribution of fares varies
by market structure: fare dispersion is found to increase with competition.
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this is obtained using the probability that a flight is sold-out, and not through the association of fares with the capacity utilization at the time the fare is posted. Both these studies,
however, rely on data generated by the more complex process used by traditional (legacy)
carriers, whose properties are only partly aligned with the assumptions adopted by any of
the models in the theoretical literature.
In addition to the capacity-driven approach, the literature has indicated that airlines
may use inter-temporal price discrimination to exploit customer’s heterogeneity in terms
of willingness-to-pay and uncertainty about departure time (Gale and Holmes, 1992, 1993;
Dana, 1999b; Möller and Watanabe, 2010). Advance-purchase discounts (APD, hereafter)
and clearance sales (CS, hereafter) provide a practical way to implement this strategy.
In Dana (1999b), firms cannot distinguish between peak and non-peak flights and travelers differ in their disutility to fly at their least preferred time; in equilibrium, firms commit
to a distribution of monotonically increasing fares over time for each flight. Gale and Holmes
(1992) show that a monopolist, and a social planner, can use APD to spread uncertain peak
demand more evenly between two flights. Gale and Holmes (1993) show that in a monopoly
with capacity constraints and perfectly predictable demand, APD arises from a mechanism
design setting where consumers self-select so that demand is diverted from peak periods to
off-peak periods. Möller and Watanabe (2010) study the conditions under which, over two
consecutive periods, prices may either decline (i.e., firms offer CS) or increase (i.e., firms
engage in APD). They demonstrate that the former (the latter) is more appropriate when
a consumer’s demand uncertainty is absent (present) and the risk of being rationed is high
(low).
This study sheds light on Ryanair’s time-driven pricing policy. The idea is that if
a temporal profile is coded into the carrier’s reservation system or is the result of the
analyst’s intervention, it can be identified by tracking the evolution of each flight’s fares
over time (Mantin and Koo, 2009). A novel feature of the present work is that we do so
after controlling for capacity utilization; thus, we are able to separate fare variations due
to purely capacity-driven motivation from those induced by the willingness to discriminate
between customers booking at different times before departure. The evidence reveals that,
in general, fares increase monotonically over the last three weeks before departure. However,
a more complex fares’ dynamics consistent with a combined use of both CS and APD is
also found over the entire booking period we take into consideration: in the two months
preceding departure the intertemporal profile of a standard flight’s fares often appears to be
U-shaped, especially in flights that fill up well in advance of departure. While the existing

4
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literature has already identified that fares generally tend to increase as the departure date
nears (Bilotkach et al., 2010; Puller et al., 2009), to our knowledge no previous contribution
has illustrated a U-shaped temporal profile of fares.
In sum, this paper offers the first combined study of two testable implications derived
from the theoretical economic literature on airline pricing. Both implications relate to the
pricing profile of carriers suggesting that fares i ) should increase as a flight fills up and
ii ) should grow over time (APD), but may have more complex U-shaped temporal pattern
combining APD and CS.
A notable innovation of this study is that it addresses both of these features simultaneously. Given the parallel movement that both effects induce on fares, studying one without
the other is likely to bias the analysis. Furthermore, the joint investigation of both properties sheds lights on the relative importance of two classes of theoretical airline pricing
models, one emphasizing a capacity-driven motivation, the other focussing on intertemporal price discrimination and customers’ segmentation (Alderighi, 2010; Puller et al., 2009).
This does not imply that a discriminatory motive is revealed only by the analysis of the
intertemporal profile of fares. It is precisely because we control for the intertemporal effects
that we can tease out a discriminatory motive in the way the airline designs the relationship
between fares and occupancy rate. Indeed, we find that the fare profile is highly affected
by market structure; it is steeper in less competitive routes, implying that in such routes
the last groups of seats are sold at a higher fare. The lack of competitive pressure thus
facilitates the extraction of surplus from consumers who learn at a late stage that they have
to fly on a specific date (which makes their demand inelastic) and who therefore end up
buying when the flight is already quite full.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the importance
of the airline whose fares we used in the study. In Section 3, we explain how we could retrieve
the information on the flight’s occupancy at the time the fares were posted. Section 4
provides some descriptive statistics on the fare profile. The econometric model used to
tackle both the censoring and the endogeneity of the number of sold seats is presented in
Section 5, which is followed by the comments to the main findings in Section 6. Section 7
concludes.
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2

Ryanair’s business model

Drawing on the business model established by Southwest Airlines in the US, Ryanair pioneered the low-cost strategy in Europe. The low-cost carrier business model that Ryanair
adopts has several notable features: (i) a simple pricing structure with one cabin class (with
optional paid-for in-flight food and drink); (ii) direct selling through internet bookings with
electronic tickets and no seat reservations; (iii) simplified point-to-point routes often involving cheaper, less congested airports; (iv) intensive aircraft usage (typically with 25-minute
turnaround times); (v) employees working in multiple roles (e.g. flight attendants, cleaning
the aircrafts and acting as gate agents); and (vi) a standardized fleet made up of only
Boeing 737-800 aircrafts, with a capacity of 189 seats.
Founded in 1985 and based in Dublin, Ryanair expanded its route network rapidly following liberalization of intra-EU air services, increasing its passenger numbers from 5.6
million in 2000 to 33.6 millions in 2005, reaching over 71.2 million by 2010. For comparison, in the same year the number of passengers flying with Lufthansa (44.4m), EasyJet
(37.6m), Air France and Emirates (both 30.8m) and British Airways (26.3m) was considerably lower.4 Not only has Ryanair been remarkably successful in growing passenger
numbers and revenues, it has also been a consistently profitable business in a sector in
which many airlines have struggled to make profits from one year to another: its operating
revenues (profit) in 2000, which amounted to 370 (72.5) million euros, escalated to the value
of 3,629 (374.6) million euros in the financial year ending on the 31 March 2011. The size
and importance of this carrier, and its ability to attract customers, make it a key player in
the European airline industry. Thus, the study of its pricing behaviour can shed empirical
light on the pricing policies of airline carriers and on the validity of the related theoretical
works.

2.1

Insights into Ryanair’s YM practices

Unlike most full service carriers, Ryanair employs a relatively simple pricing structure
with no price discrimination based on multiple service and cabin classes and on specific
restrictions like minimum stay requirements and Saturday night stay-overs. Furthermore,
all its tickets carry the same penalties for a name, date and/or route variation and permit
the same free in-flight hand baggage allowance (10 kg) with a fixed fee for boarded baggage
(max 15 kg per person in a single luggage). None of these impinge on the YM aspects on
4

The information in this section is drawn from material, including yearly Financial Reports, available
from Ryanair’s website www.ryanair.com/en/about.

6

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper665

6

Alderighi et al.: Combined Effects of Load Factors and Booking Time on Fares:

which we focus on in this paper, since they are unaffected by capacity utilization and/or by
temporal aspects.5 Thus, the use of Ryanair data offers some advantages for the empirical
analysis, since its ticket characteristics (identical restrictions) are close to the modelling
assumption of many theoretical works.
Interesting insights into how Ryanair operates its YM system are given in European
Commission (2007), which provides details of the investigation that lead to the decision to
block the takeover of Ryanair over Aer Lingus. Both companies adopt a certain number
of standard “templates”, which describe “the number of places that should be available
in a given price category (“booking class”) (p. 109, item 439)”. Templates are chosen by
a yield manager with the aid of a software that tracks the booking status of each flight.
The analyst can compare the actual booking status (or “load factor”) of a flight with
the booking forecast which is provided by the system. When the load factor falls behind
forecast, the analyst may decide “to stimulate the demand, normally by making more seats
available in the cheaper price categories (p. 109, item 440)”. The analysis in European
Commission (2007) thus suggests that (i ) the initial number of seats allocated to each
booking class is set through the choice of a template defining the distribution of cheaper
and more expensive seats; (ii ) fare adjustments are generally designed as a switch or shift
of the template. Such adjustments are generated by an “analyst’s intervention” in response
to either a misalignment between actual and forecasted load factors, or external factors,
e.g., the need to match a rival’s fare.
More importantly, the foregoing discussion highlights two important YM activities,
both contributing to the determination of the airline’s fares. On the one hand, the airline
follows a standard, “routinary” approach when it sets the fares for a flight with specific
characteristics (e.g., route, time and day of departure etc.). On the other, idiosyncratic,
discretional interventions by an yield analyst may be due to either external (e.g., matching
rivals’ prices, new qualitative information on future demand etc.) or internal (a promotional
policy required by the marketing manager, etc.) factors. One of the main contributions
of this paper is to show how the routinary activity is captured by an augmented version
of the template, which simultaneously details how fares are related to seat occupancy and
how they are designed to change as the time to departure nears.6 By doing so, we shed
5

The charges for a ticket variation are so high relative to the average price of a ticket that it is often
cheaper to buy a new ticket. This, combined with the fact that Ryanair does not practice overbooking,
may explain why we practically observe no cases where capacity utilization decreases over two consecutive
periods. Further, the luggage charge was started after our sample period ended.
6
In Section 4.2 we show how changes over time appear to be coded into the airline’s computerized
reservation system.
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light on the role played by the capacity and time-driven theories in explaining the airlines’
fare setting process.

3

Data Collection

Our analysis is based on primary data on fares collected using an “electronic spider” linking
to the website of Ryanair. The database includes daily flights information from January
2004 up to, and including, June 2005. In order to account for the heterogeneity of fares
offered by airlines at different times prior to departure, every day we instructed the spider
to collect the fares for departures due, respectively, 1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49,
56, 63 and 70 days from the date of the query. Henceforth, these will be referred to as
BookingDays.7 Thus, for every daily flight we managed to obtain up to 13 prices that differ
by the time interval from the day of departure. Thus, we can identify the evolution of fares
over time - from more than two months prior to departure to the day before departure.
Data collection was carried out everyday at the same time and included: the price of
one seat, which in the remainder of the paper is denoted as Fare1, the number of seats
available at each booking day, denoted as Seats, and the corresponding unit price for a
query involving that number of seats, referred to as TopFare since it is never smaller than
Fare1 (see subsection 3.2 for a discussion of both fares and their role within a template). We
also collected the time and date of the query, the departure date, the scheduled departure
and arrival time, the origin and destination airports and the flight identification code, which
will be used as controls in the econometric analysis.
In addition to UK domestic fares, routes to the following countries were surveyed:
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden.
For consistency, the procedure considered only flights departing from an airport within the
UK, and arriving at either a domestic or an international airport. We have data for 82 of
the 154 routes that Ryanair operated to these countries over the sample period; in some
cases, we consider more than one flight code per route when the airline operated more than
one daily flight. All fares, which do not include tax and handling fees, are for a one-way
flight and are quoted in Sterling.8 Some descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 and
7
For instance, assume the queries were carried out on March 1st 2004. The spider would retrieve the fares
for flights whose departures was due on 2/3/04, 5/3/04, 8/3/04, 11/3/04 etc. The routine was repeated
every day over the data collection period.
8
Focusing only on the outward leg from the UK emerges as a valid data collection strategy since it is
widely acknowledged that European LCAs price each leg independently (Bachis and Piga, 2011). Moreover,
excluding taxes and fees does not affect the results for the following reasons. First, Ryanair started charging
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2, whose comment is deferred to section 3.2.

3.1

Retrieving data on Seats and TopFare

The collection strategy exploited a feature of the Ryanair’s website: during the sample
period, Ryanair allowed purchases of up to 50 seats using a single query. This made it
possible to learn if, at the time of the query, fewer than 50 seats were available on a flight
with a specific identification code. The spider worked using the following algorithm:
• issue a query for S = 50 seats for a specific flight identified by a unique flight code
on a route. The flight was due to depart D days from the date of the query, where D
assumes the values of the BookingDay previously introduced.
• If the airline’s site returned a valid fare for that flight code, then we interpreted this
finding as follows: D days prior to departure, there were at least 50 seats available on
the flight. We could not however retrieve any more precise information regarding the
actual number of available seats, which is thus censored at the level of 50. The spider
would then save the value of Seats= 50, and the corresponding value of TopFare, as
well as the value of D and all the other flight’s details (see above).
• If the site failed to return a valid fare for that flight, the programme inferred that
there were fewer than 50 seats available and then started a search to obtain the highest
number of seats in a query that returned a valid fare. This corresponds to the number
of seats available D days before a flight’s departure, a value which was saved in Seats.
In this case, TopFare corresponds to the unit price at which the airline was willing to
sell all the S remaining seats in a single transaction.
By repeating this procedure every day, we could track the seats and the associated fare
for each value of BookingDay.

3.2

Interpretation of retrieved fares

When Seats < 50, TopFare corresponds to the fare of a transaction whose completion would
fill the flight to capacity.9 For this reason, TopFare presents two important characteristics.
a fixed fee for check-in and luggage only in 2006, that is, after our sample period. Second, the fixed perpassenger tax that contributes to the full cost of the ticket would not impinge on the evaluation of how a
flight’s fare change relative to the flight’s occupancy rate or over time.
9
If, for example, the spider returned 26 left seats for a given booking day, then the retrieved fare would
correspond to the posted fare for a booking of 26 seats, i.e., for the number of seats that would close the
flight.
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First, as Table 1 shows, it hardly varies with the number of seats. Indeed, for all the routes
in the Table, it appears clear that, despite the wide sample period covered by the data,
the distribution of TopFare is highly concentrated. In many routes, its maximum value
coincides with the median and the mode values, which are in turn only marginally above
the mean value, thus suggesting a very limited number of cases where TopFare assumes
values below the mode. In other routes, the maximum value is higher, but not more than
£10 or £20 than the median/mode. Overall, it appears that TopFare is largely insensitive
to the number of seats that remain to be sold as well as to the number of days that separate
the fare retrieval from the flight’s departure. This is supported also by the low standard
deviations reported.10
Second, and relatedly, if Seats < 50, in line with the capacity-driven approach, TopFare
represents the maximum fare of a flight. When a query that closes the flight is issued, the
Ryanair’s reservation system always retrieves the fare that is associated with the value
of the last seat.11 This implies that the value of TopFare and Fare1 can coincide when
only a few seats remain on a flight. Table 2 reports the maximum and mean values for
the Fare1 variable. The maximum value for one seat is generally either identical to or
slightly below the equivalent value for TopFare when there are less than 50 seats available.
Therefore, we have cases where the values of TopFare coincide with the highest values
of Fare1. Relatedly, the mean values of Fare1 across all routes are well below those in
Table 1, even when we condition on observations with less than 50 seats available. Indeed,
conditioning for Seats < 50, Fare1 is more dispersed than TopFare, given the wider gap
between the maximum and the mean values of Fare1 relative to those of TopFare. An
implication is that TopFare does not represent an average of the remaining “forward”
values of Fare1. If this were the case, TopFare would change with the number of remaining
seats.
Always with reference to Table 2, with 50 seats or more available the fares for one seat
cannot, a fortiori, refer to the last seats available on a flight, and indeed we do not observe
any coincidence between equivalent values of Fare1 and TopFare between the two Tables.
Furthermore, the value of one seat when there are at least 50 available is expected to be
10
That is, the spider retrieved the same value of TopFare (or very similar ones) both when the “booking
day” was, say, 28 days from departure and there were 45 seats available to sell, and when the “booking day”
was 10 and the spare capacity was 22.
11
The capacity of a Ryanair’s flight is 189 seats. When Seats = N < 50, issuing a query for N seats
always retrieves the value of the 189th seat in the template. Consistently, when S = 50, i.e., when we do
not know the exact number of available seats, TopFare indicates the fare of the 50th seat ahead of the one
being available.

10
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not higher than the fare for one seat when 49 ones remain to be sold. This is clearly borne
out by the difference in the mean values of Fare1 when the remaining number of seats is
either below the value of 50 or not.

4

Preliminary evidence

The results drawn from the descriptive analysis in this section help gain better insights into
the airline’s pricing policy and its relation with both the in-flight seat availability and the
purchasing date. They also provide a useful guide for the specification of the econometric
model and the interpretation of its findings.

4.1

The fare-occupancy rate schedule

Figure 1 shows the median spline plot of Fare1 on Sold Seats, which represents the complement to 50 for the number of available seats retrieved by the spider (i.e. 50 − Seats) and
is thus available only for those observations where the number of available seats is strictly
less than 50. The values in the Figure refer to the London Gatwick - Dublin route: each
line represents a different flight code. The lowest fare is about £25, while the highest is just
below £150. In all periods the plot shows, on average, a monotonically increasing relationship; however, there are a number of instances where Fare1 marginally falls as occupancy
increases. A smoother increasing relationship is obtained in Figure 2, where we use the Log
of Fare1 in a non-parametric fit with the last 50 seats’ occupancy.
To generalize the evidence from one route to the entire sample, in Figure 3 we follow
the approach used in Puller et al. (2009). We first calculate, for each flight-code/booking
day combination, the mean value of both Fare1 and Sold Seats in a given month; then, we
derive the percentage deviation of each daily observation from each respective mean value.
We then aggregate the pairs of percentage deviations across three categories of booking
days: early, middle and late. In the first category, a percentage increase (decrease) of
20% of Sold Seats from its mean, as reported on the horizontal axis, is associated with
a percentage increase (decrease) of about 100% (60-70%) in Fare1 from its mean (as can
be read on the vertical axis). As the date of departure approaches, fares become more
responsive to increases in a flight’s occupancy rate. Indeed, the same increase of 20% over
the mean of Sold Seats is associated with almost a 200% increase in Fare1 over its mean,
when we consider the middle and late booking days’ categories. Interestingly, ten to one
days to departure, the same 20% decrease from the mean of Sold Seats is met only by
11
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a similar decrease in the mean of Fare1. It is worth stressing here that the evidence in
Figure 3 does not necessarily imply any temporal effect and may be easily reconciled with
the capacity-driven approach. Indeed, it is obvious that as the date of departure nears,
the flight becomes fuller (and therefore the fares higher). If the fare/occupancy function is
non-linear as Figure 1 may suggest, and its gradient becomes steeper as the flight fills up,
then the middle and late booking days’ categories will include a greater proportions of high
fares, and thus drive the findings reported in Figure 3. Incidentally, this view lends support
to the notion that seat availability is a crucial source of fare dispersion. Nonetheless, a
complementary possibility could be that the large percentage increases may arise due to
the combined effect of temporal as well as occupancy rate changes.
A number of considerations can be drawn from the foregoing graphical analysis. First,
the evidence reported in Figure 3 suggests that YM techniques designed by airlines to manage capacity constitute an important factor driving fares’ dispersion. Interestingly, despite
the methodological similarity, Puller et al. (2009) reach an opposite conclusion in their study
of U.S. airline markets.12 Second, it introduces the need to combine capacity concerns with
at least two other aspects of YM: 1) the fares’ temporal profile, i.e., the possibility that fares
may change regardless of the flight’s occupancy rate and 2) the discretional intervention of
an yield manager to tackle unexpected contingencies. The latter point will be considered
in the econometric analysis, where we employ instrumental variable techniques to isolate
the carrier’s routinary pricing behaviour net of such discretional interventions. Given the
crucial role of advance purchase discount (APD) in the literature, in the next section we
delve deeper into the existence and the characteristics of the temporal profile (Gale and
Holmes, 1992, 1993; Dana, 1999b; Möller and Watanabe, 2010).

4.2

Do fares increase over time all the times?

The descriptive analysis in the previous sub-section highlighted a positive relationship between fares and sold seats, that appears to hold on average over a range of dates and routes.
In this sub-section, we extend the analysis by focusing on possible intertemporal effects in
the airline’s pricing structure. Our objective is to separate fare changes induced by variations in the flight’s load factor from temporal effects that are unrelated with the actual
evolution of sold seats. This is also important in terms of modelling testing, because the
literature on APD leads to predictions that may be confused with those derived in the case
12
Differences may be due to the different type of airlines considered (legacy vs. low cost) and to the
different methods used to obtain the flights’ occupancy rate.
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where fares are only driven by the shadow cost of capacity. That is, in both cases, fares
may increase over time. Indeed, under APD, there is a moment when the airlines increase
their fares to exploit costumer heterogeneity.
Table 3 reinforces the previous analysis, and shows that, when we hold the booking day
fixed and look at the fares in each line of the table, fares in our sample on average decrease
as more seats on the plane are available. More interestingly, when we condition on capacity
utilization to see how fares on average change with the booking day, we observe that the
intertemporal profile of fares assumes a U-shaped form, with the minimum fares occurring
21 to 14 days prior to departure. Indeed, the evidence in every column suggests that during
the last fortnight fares return to the level they assumed about 35-28 days before departure.
Thus, Table 3 provides prima facie evidence that a more appropriate representation of the
intertemporal profile of the fares in our sample should include both APD (because fares
increase in the last fortnight) and discount sales, since fares appear to drop between 21 and
14 days from departure (Möller and Watanabe, 2010).
However, it might be possible that the temporal profile in Table 3 is due to the aggregation of fares from heterogenous routes and the extensive sample period used. Therefore,
Table 4 focuses on economically significant (i.e., worth at least £5) fare changes that occur within a single flight. It illustrates the likelihood of a fare drop over two consecutive
booking days conditional on available seats remaining stable or decreasing. Under such
circumstances, we should not observe any drop in fares if the template is decided once and
for all, as discussed in Dana (1999a). Conversely, the airline adjusts its fares downward
quite frequently, and in ways that appear to be consistent with an active intervention by the
yield manager, as suggested in European Commission (2007). First, in each row the likelihood of observing a price drop generally increases as more seats are available, especially
when the departure time is not within a week.13 This is consistent with the expectation
that drops are likely meant to stimulate demand. The Total row indicates that 13% of
observations with at least 40 seats available report fare drops, while this occurs in only 6%
of observations where less than 10 seats are recorded. Second, the highest probabilities of
observing a drop are found in the 28-14 days period, after which they diminish sharply and
are hardly observed a few days prior to a flight’s departure.
Table 4 can only identify cases of decreases, but not increases, over time. However, for
13
The fact that 4 − 5% of late booking cases report a drop when less than ten seats are available indicates
an active intervention, which may be explained by the carrier’s desire to fill a flight to capacity to generate
ancillary revenues and boost market shares. This incentive is however offset by the need not to offer “lastminute discounts”, which customers may learn to anticipate: hence the lower probability of observing a drop
within a week from departure.
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the large majority of observations, fares increase between two consecutive booking days, and
at the same time, available capacity reduces. In such a case, using descriptive statistics, it is
not easy to separate the variation due to capacity utilization from the temporal variation.
In Table 5 we show a pure temporal variation, since we hold in-flight occupancy fixed
between two consecutive booking days by considering only those observations where the
number of available seats has not changed over two consecutive booking periods. Any
change in price is thus not due to a change in the occupancy rate. We distinguish between
Large and Moderate changes, the former being greater than £20.0 in absolute terms. As
the first row in the Table indicates, the average value of a change tends to be the same for
each category of decreases and increases. We also consider the case of no change, which,
in line with the capacity-driven theory, accounts for the largest majority of observations
(about 73%). Interestingly, this also implies that 27% of fare changes are generated by
a pure temporal effect, with increases (N = 1905) being more than twice as many as
decreases (N = 919). The way changes are distributed across flight characteristics does not
appear to differ significantly, with some minor exceptions. First, the proportion of increases
(decreases) is above (below) the sample mean when the booking day is (is not) within two
weeks from departure. That is, it is more likely to observe a fare increase as the date of
departure nears. By the same token, large increases are hardly observed during the early
booking period. Second, more temporal variability (i.e., both more increases and decreases)
is found in flights that have more than 20 seats available and are operated in routes with
low competition.14
Overall, the evidence in Tables 3-5 suggest that fares are affected by a combination of
capacity and temporal considerations. These will be further investigated in the econometric
analysis.

5

The econometric model

We aim at estimating a pricing equation linking a flight’s seat occupancy and time before departure with offered fares to identify the standard pricing behaviour of the airline.
However, a standard OLS regression of the price (obtained from a query for a single seat)
on the number of sold seats is not appropriate because Sold Seats has two features which
need special attention. A first obvious issue is the endogeneity of this variable, since some
unobserved determinants of the airline pricing behaviour may be correlated with a specific
14

See section 6.3 for a formal definition of routes with high and low competition.
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flight’s time-invariant factors (an issue which could be dealt with the standard fixed-effects
panel technique) and, more importantly, with the idiosyncratic, discretional intervention of
the airline’s yield manager. This problem calls for an instrumental variables estimator. A
second, more subtle, issue, is that the number of sold seats is censored due to the retrieving
procedure. Indeed, the number of sold seats may range from 0 to 189, i.e., the airline’s
aircrafts capacity. However, we can only detect the number of available seats when they
are less than 50. This censoring, therefore, induces a bias in the estimates, and needs to be
corrected.
Consider a simple model where y is a function of a vector of explanatory variables, x,
and z is a vector of instruments such that:
y = xβ + u

(1)

E(u | z) = 0
The key assumption underlying the validity of two stage least squares (2SLS) on the
selected sample is E(u | z, s) = 0, where s is a selection indicator. This assumption holds if
we observe a random sample selection: s is independent of (z, u), and a sufficient condition
for this is that s is independent of (x, y, z). Therefore, it can be proven that the 2SLS
estimator on the selected subsample is consistent for β.
However, if the selection indicator is not independent from x, as in our case, things are
different. Suppose that x is exogenous, and s is a nonrandom function of (x, v), where v is
a variable not appearing in equation (1). If (u, v) is independent of x, then E(u | x, v) =
E(u | v) and we may write:
E(y | x) = xβ + E(u | x, v) = xβ + E(u | v)
Specifying a functional form for E(u | v) = γv, we can rewrite:
E(y | x) = xβ + γv + e
where e = u − E(u | v). As s is a function of (x, v), E(e | x, v, s) = 0 and β and
γ can be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) on the selected sample.
Thus, including v in the regression eliminates the sample selection problem and allows to
consistently estimate β. Of course, if some variable in x is endogenous, the procedure to
correct for sample selection is the same, while to consistently estimate β we need 2SLS.
In our specific case, one of the explanatory variables, Sold Seats, is expected to be correlated with the error term u, and therefore instrumental variables are required. Moreover,
we need to specify the selection mechanism, which in this case is determined by a censoring
15
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of the data. The model in the population is:
F are1 = z1 δ1 + α Sold Seats + u

(2)

where Sold Seats is the endogenous regressor, and z1 are the other exogenous regressors.15 Equation (3) is a linear projection for the endogenous and censored variable, while
equation (4) describes the censoring induced by the data retrieving procedure:
Sold Seats = zδ 2 + v2

(3)

Sold Seats∗ = max(0, zδ 3 + v3 )

(4)

We allow correlation among the three error terms. We assume: a) (z, Sold Seats∗ ) is
always observed, but (F are1, Sold Seats) is observed when Sold Seats is not censored,
i.e., when Sold Seats∗ > 0; b) (u, v3 ) is independent of z; c) v3 is normally distributed;
d) E(u | v3 ) = γ1 v3 ; e) E(z0v2 ) = 0 and zδ 2 = z1 δ21 + z2 δ22 where δ22 6= 0. Defining
e ≡ u − E(u | v3 ) = u − γ v3 equation (2) can be written as
F are1 = z1 δ1 + α Sold Seats + γv3 + e

(5)

Since (e, v3 ) is independent of z by assumption b), we have that E(e | z, v3 ) = 0. As
discussed above, if v3 were observed we could estimate equation (5) by 2SLS on the selected
sample using as instruments z and v3 . However, we can estimate v3 when Sold Seats∗ > 0,
since δ3 can be consistently estimated by Tobit of Sold Seats∗ on z, on the entire sample.
To sum up, we proceed as follows:
1. We estimate a Tobit specification for equation (4) using all observations;
2. We retrieve the residuals: v̂3 = Sold Seats∗ − zδ̂ 3 for the selected subsample;
3. On the selected subsample, we estimate a modified version of (5), where instead of
v3 , which is not observed, we include v̂3 among the regressors. As Sold Seats is endogenous, we adopt an Instrumental Variable 2 Stage Fixed Effect (IVFE) estimator,
using as instruments z1 and v̂3 .16
15

The true fare setting model should also include the analyst’s discretional intervention, AY M , so that
F are1 = z1 δ1 + α Sold Seats + λAY M + ε. Because AY M is unobserved and its effect is included in
u, endogeneity is thus due to an omitted variable problem resulting from the positive correlation between
Sold Seats and AY M . Indeed, the analyst is more likely to discretionally reduce (increase) fares when
Sold Seats is low (high).
16
Our approach therefore strictly follows the Procedure 17.4 in Wooldridge (2002, p.574).
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It is possible to test if the selection bias is statistically significant by observing the t
statistic on v̂3 in the IVFE model: when γ1 6= 0 standard errors should be corrected. We
do so by means of a bootstrapping procedure.

5.1

Model specification

To estimate (5), given the structure of our data, we focus on a panel where the identifier is
the single flight (defined by a combination of departure date and flight code) and the time
dimension is given by the time interval from the day of departure (i.e., the booking day).
This panel structure allows to control for all unobserved characteristics which are specific
to the single flight, such as, for instance, market structure and distance. Furthermore,
focussing on a single flight using a fixed-effects approach allows to control for possible
strategic effects at the route level, where, e.g., the airline can opt to implement temporary
capacity limits, i.e., reduce the number of daily flights.
With regards to the regressors in (5), z1 includes a set of booking days dummies and
month of booking dummies. These exogenous regressors are part of the set of explanatory
variables, z, in the first stage estimation. To these we add the residuals from the Tobit
procedure, v̂3 , to account for the sample selection. As exclusion restrictions, we consider two
instruments. Their validity depends on the extent they are correlated with Sold Seats and
uncorrelated with the residuals e of the pricing equation. The first is a dummy indicating
whether the day the fare was posted is during a holiday period (i.e., main UK Bank Holidays
and the week before and after Christmas and Easter). Its effect on Sold Seats may be driven
by the fact that the ticket purchasing activity in such periods is likely to be different from
non-holiday periods (e.g., when on holiday a person is less likely to spend time planning
future trips), and that this difference does not bring about a discretional intervention by
the yield manager (e.g., because there are fewer staff working during holidays). The second
instrument is derived by building upon the interpretation of Top Fare and Fare1 presented
in Section 3.2. Their difference captures a relevant feature of the flight’s pricing template,
that is, how the gap between the two fares narrows as the flight fills up; such a gap is clearly
highly correlated with the occupancy rate, but it is also correlated with e. However, under
the assumption that template changes are specific to each daily flight, using the lagged and
the forward values of this difference would still retain the important information about the
template, without any correlation with other flights’ idiosyncratic shocks. To capture the
fact that templates may change with the day of the week, the instrument denoted “L-FW
Mean ∆ Fare” is constructed by taking, for each day of week-flight code combination, the
17
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difference between Top Fare and Fare1 in the two weekdays preceding (Lag) and following
(Forward) the combination, and then by taking the mean of these four values.
Notice that in principle the same set of exogenous variables, z, could appear in the
selection equation and in the first stage of the IV procedure.17 However, in practice, the
two sets of regressors should differ, otherwise a severe problem of multicollinearity between
v̂3 and z1 may affect the results. Therefore, in the Tobit specification for model (4) we
exclude the dummy for the booking during a holiday period and instead we include the
number of UK airports serving the destination airport: this is not correlated with v3 , since
the decision to open a route is generally taken in the preceding quarter, but it captures
that a higher demand destination is more likely to be served by more than one UK airport.
Furthermore, dummies for the weekday of booking are included in the Tobit, but not in the
IVFE model. Finally, a set of week, route, and daytime of departure dummies are included.
These would be dropped in the IVFE procedure used in (5).
The validity of the chosen instruments is confirmed by a number of tests presented in
Tables 7-11. The first one is the Hansen’s J statistic for overidentifying restrictions: the
joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid. If the test fails to reject the null
hypothesis, then all instruments used are considered exogenous. The second one is the
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic, which tests whether the equation is identified. A rejection
of the null indicates that the matrix of reduced form coefficients is full column rank and the
model is identified.18 To anticipate our results, both tests, as well as the weak instruments
tests not reported, strongly support our choice of instruments.
Finally, Table 3 shows that there is a more than proportional increase in fares for any
additional seat sold, suggesting a log-linear specification of the model.

6

Results

Table 6 reports the Tobit and the first stage estimates, respectively. As discussed above,
although in principle the two sets of regressors should be identical, problems of multicollinearity require the two groups to differ. Additionally, the two estimation samples
differ, as the Tobit model is estimated on all available observations, while the IVFE model
is run on the non-censored subsample. Notwithstanding these two differences, we observe
17

The econometric identification of the main equation can rely on the non-linearity of the auxiliary
regression. However, for economic identification, different instruments are required (Wooldridge, 2002).
18
The tests for weak instruments are reported only in Table 6, for the full sample IVFE estimates in Table
7. As for the specifications presented in Tables 8-11, the tests are not reported but available upon request.
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similar results in the two specifications. This suggests that we are correctly accounting
for censoring in the dependent variable of the Tobit and for its possible bias in the IVFE
estimates.19
Table 7 shows the second step of the two stage least squares estimation. We compare the
results with an OLS specification which corrects for selection, but not for the endogeneity
of Sold Seats. Notice that the IV approach yields a lower coefficient for Sold Seats: an
extra sold seat induces a 3.10% increase in fares if we do not correct for endogeneity, while
the IVFE specification indicates a 2.56% increase.20 The magnitude of the Sold Seats coefficient suggests that a considerable proportion of a flight’s fare dispersion can be attributed
to a load factor effect. Indeed, if we apply a 2.56% change rate per seat to the mean value
of Fare1 (£65.35) when Sold Seats changes from its mean sample value (23) to either its
maximum (49) or minimum value (1), we obtain a prediction for the fare of about £122.94
and £37.47 , respectively.21 These results provide strong support to the capacity-driven
approach and therefore shed empirical light on the relevance of the theoretical set-up developed in Dana (1999a). In addition, this contrasts with the conclusions in Puller et al.
(2009) where fares appear to be insensitive to a flight’s occupancy rate.
The temporal profile in the two estimations are also quite different. The coefficients of
the “Booking Days” dummies in the IV specification suggest a steeper (relative to the OLS)
increase in prices in the last days before the flight. Relative to the base case of prices posted
70 days from departure, for fares posted 7, 4 and 1 days we record percentage increases
of about 24%, 58% and 114%, respectively.22 The evidence supports an important role
for APD, at least as far as the booking period comprising the 2 weeks before departure is
concerned. Notice however that the IVFE estimates do not provide any support for the
U-shaped temporal profile. This may be due to a compositional effect in the full sample.
Indeed, the U-shaped profile is found in more homogenous subsamples (see below), which
suggests that it may be part of a standard pricing policy only in specific circumstances.
All in all, after controlling for endogeneity (i.e., after purging the estimates from the
effect due to the discretional analyst intervention), we obtain strong evidence supporting a
19
As a further check, we have run the IVFE regression by omitting the Tobit residuals: the first stage
estimates - not reported to save space but available on request - are considerably different from the ones
reported in Table 6.
20
The upward bias of the OLS coefficient for Sold Seats comes from the fact that it includes both the
direct impact of Sold Seats due to the airline pricing policy and the indirect impact due to an analyst
intervention, which is positively related with Sold Seats. See fn.15.
21
Note that the 5th and the 95th percentile values of Fare1 are, respectively, 13.99 and 149.99.
22
E.g., for the “Booking Day7” dummy, the percent change relative to the base period is found by using
exp(0.2171) − 1 ∼
= 0.24.
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crucial role for both capacity and time-driven approaches in driving the airline’s standard
(i.e., routinary) pricing policy. It is important to note, however, that the results in Table
7 are obtained using data from an heterogenous sample featuring 82 routes that differ
in terms of market structure and length. In turn, each route includes flights which vary
by departure time, day of the week, seasonal period etc. Indeed, the summary statistics
reported in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the pricing policy of the airline could vary across
routes (e.g. substantial differences in terms of mean and maximum value of Fare1 and Top
Fare); furthermore, Tables 4 and 5 suggest additional complexity in the pricing behaviour
that is compatible with variability at the flight level.
In the remainder of the paper, we study how the average pricing policy depicted in
Table 7 changes as we take these sources of heterogeneity into account. The evidence we
present also reveals the robustness of the importance of capacity and temporal effects in the
determination of the airline’s standard pricing policy. In subsection 6.1 we consider flights
that filled up either early or late, but both realized a final high load factor. In subsection
6.2, we further investigate how the pricing policy adjusts to different flights characteristics,
i.e., route distance, time of day and season. Finally, in subsection 6.3 we analyze the pricing
policy differences driven by market structure.

6.1

Early and late full flights

In this subsection we study whether differences in the pricing profile arise when we compare
flights that reached a sufficiently high load factor early rather than late. This comparison
may capture the airline’s different expectations about the underlying demand conditions,
which, in turn, may induce the application of different standard pricing policies.
We classify flights as either being full early or not. In Table 8, we consider the former
category, i.e., flights that had less than 30 seats available at least 14 days prior to departure,
while flights that did not fill up early are considered in Table 9.23 Most importantly, both
Tables report the estimates from samples that realized an equivalent level of the final load
factor. Thus, in each column, we consider flights whose lowest recorded value of available
seats was strictly below, respectively, the value of 30 or 15. Therefore, an alternative
interpretation of the samples in Tables 8 and 9 is that they differ only because they are
made up of flights that sold a larger proportion of seats prior to, or within, the last two
weeks before departure, respectively.
23
Results, not reported but available on request, are robust when we consider flights with less that 30
seats available 28 or 21 days before departure.
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The coefficients of Sold Seats is about 0.14%−0.3% larger for flights that filled up at an
early stage. Such differences do not however impinge on the conclusion that routinely fares
increase as the plane becomes fuller. As far as the temporal effects are concerned, large
increases in the last week prior to departure are also observed in all specifications. More
interestingly, and in line with the descriptive evidence in Table 3 and the OLS estimates
in Table 7, over the two months preceding departure the temporal effects appear to be
U-shaped in the case of flights that filled up early, which reports significant drops in fares
between 42 and 14 days from departure. This contrasts with the coefficients in Table 9,
where the only significant temporal effects are those for late booking days. Overall, while
the analysis in this section confirms the important role played by both the capacity and the
temporal dimensions, it also highlights how the airline may vary their combined structure
depending on some of the underlying characteristics at the flight or route level.

6.2

Time of the day, seasonality and route length

Table 10 offers further insights into the nature of the effects of in-flight occupancy and
booking days on fares. First, we use the samples of morning and evening flights, since the
departure time is likely to vary with the passengers’ travel motivation and their flight’s
convenience.24 The coefficient of Sold Seats is found to be larger in the evening sample; as
Figures 4 and 5 clearly suggest, this is likely due to the fact that evening flights include a
larger proportions of observations with both a higher number of sold seats and, hence, such
a larger demand is met with a pricing policy designed to manage a higher shadow cost of
capacity.
Second, the last two columns of Table 10 consider the two samples of flights operated
in the Winter (Nov-Mar) and the Summer (Apr-Oct) periods. Because Ryanair serves
many Mediterranean destination whose demand is obviously larger in the Summer, the
higher coefficient for Sold Seats is again due to the adoption of a pricing policy which
weighs capacity issues more heavily. Interestingly, the U-shaped intertemporal profile is
only found in the Summer flights, possibly because larger demand is also accompanied by
larger customers’ heterogeneity. In such a situation, the airline faces a stronger incentive
to adopt a U-shaped intertemporal profile to attract price-sensitive consumers with high
demand uncertainty who would not book their flights too in advance.
Finally, in Table 11 we investigate whether the different cost structure that characterizes
24
Morning flights are from 6am to 11am; evening ones from 4pm to 10.15pm. We thus exclude late
morning and afternoon flights.
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routes of varying length may affect the carrier’s pricing approach. Indeed, short haul flights
are subject to a greater incidence of fixed costs on total costs, due to the greater fuel
consumption during take-off and landing. In-flight occupancy appears to play a similar role
in both types of routes; however, the intertemporal effect is U-shaped only in short-haul
flights.

6.3

Market structure

As previously discussed, Dana (1999a) characterizes an equilibrium in price distributions
where higher prices are associated with higher occupancy rates. An important prediction
of Dana’s model is that the price distribution’s domain expands as competition increases:
unlike a monopolist, competitive firms pass through all of their cost increases and therefore
they should exhibit more intrafirm price dispersion. However, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)
argue that in less competitive markets it may be easier to implement price discrimination
tactics: their estimates support the hypothesis that overall price dispersion should decrease
with competition. By focussing on particular forms of online price discrimination strategies
by European LCAs, Bachis and Piga (2011) also show that such strategies are more likely
found in less competitive markets.
To study how the coefficient of Sold Seats changes with market structure, we have
distinguished between markets with low and high competition, where a market is identified
at both the route and the city-pair level.25 In lowly competitive markets, Ryanair is at
most a duopolist at either the route or the city-pair level, while in highly competitive ones
travellers may substitute Ryanair’s services with those of at least two or more of its direct
competitors in that route/city-pair.26
Table 11 reports the estimates from the low and the high competition subsamples,
and shows that the coefficient of Sold Seats is larger in markets with low competition.
Thus, when travellers find it more difficult to substitute Ryanair’s services with those of
competitors, Ryanair appears to adopt a pricing policy where a larger proportion of seats
are assigned higher fares, and therefore the gradient of Sold Seats is on average, steeper
than those in more competitive markets. Our findings therefore suggest that competitive
pressure may prevent Ryanair from extracting more surplus from those travellers’ segments
whose demand is more inelastic because their need to travel on a specific flight is revealed
25
A city-pair defines the airline market for two cities (e.g., London and Milan). It generally includes
more than one route, each identified by a unique airport-pair combination (e.g., London Heathrow/Milan
Malpensa and London Stansted/Milan Linate).
26
Data on market structure are obtained from the UK Civil Aviation Authority.
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only a few days before its departure, when therefore fewer seats remain available.
As far as the intertemporal profile is concerned, the estimates confirm the previous
finding of significant fare increases during the last ten days of booking. However, market
structure does not seem to be an explanatory factor for the presence of a U-shaped relationship. More precisely, flights exhibiting significant price drops six to three weeks before
departure do not feature prominently or exclusively in either subsamples in Table 11.

7

Conclusions

This study builds on the extensive and well developed theoretical literature on airline pricing
and sheds new empirical light on two of its predictions. It thus fills a gap in the literature,
since there are very few studies that managed to overcome the scarcity of appropriate data.
To do so, we rely on data obtained from the website of Ryanair, whose business model very
closely aligns with the assumptions used in the theoretical literature.
Both the descriptive and the econometric evidence lend strong support to the hypothesis
of fares becoming higher as fewer seats remain available on a flight. On average, we find that
each extra sold seat induces a 2.56% increase in a flight’s fare. This drives to the conclusion
that the capacity-driven motivation is an important determinant of airline pricing. This
inference appears to be robust to the criticism that capacity-driven theories are derived
assuming a perfect commitment by the airlines not to revise their pricing curve as they
gather new information about a flight’s actual demand.
The study also reveals novel evidence regarding the temporal profile of fares. All econometric specifications indicate a sharp increase in fares in the last ten days prior to departure,
which is consistent with the idea that late bookers are less willing to substitute a flight with
another departing on a different time or date. This leads to the conclusion that Ryanair’s
pricing policy appears to be designed to include late increases in fares regardless of the
actual load factor realization. That is, higher late fares are part of an ex-ante YM decision
by the airline.
More importantly, the descriptive evidence points to a more complex, U-shaped temporal profile, where early bookers (those booking at least 49 days prior to departure) appear
to pay a higher fare than those booking between 35 and 14 days from departure. The
econometric evidence captures a similar effect only for those flights that filled up relatively
quickly. Although the empirical evidence shows that the advance purchase discount strategy (on which the theoretical literature has largely focussed) is often complemented (and
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preceded) with a clearance sale one (Möller and Watanabe, 2010). This appears to be the
case especially in periods of high demand, i.e., during the Summer season. Overall, the evidence indicates that a monotonic temporal profile, which is typical of the APD approach,
is not necessarily observed after capacity utilization is controlled for.
To conclude, in addition to providing a test for two strands of literature on airline
pricing, this paper provides the foundation for an investigation of the theoretical prediction,
reported in Dana (1999a), that fare dispersion is expected to be larger in competitive
markets. Although this issue has been widely studied, the prediction has received mixed
support when dispersion is measured at the route-level (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Gerardi
and Shapiro, 2009). The flight-level analysis in this study supports the findings in Gerardi
and Shapiro (2009) that the lack of competitive pressure allows Ryanair to extract more
surplus from consumers with more inelastic demand. This is revealed in our estimates by
a steeper pricing curve in less competitive markets, implying that the last seats are sold at
higher fares. Because the last seats on a flight are generally purchased by travellers with a
highly inelastic demand, this study suggests that the lack of competitive pressure appears
to facilitate the implementation of price discrimination tactics in European routes.
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Table 1: Distribution of T opF are, by route.
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Route
BLK-DUB
BHX-DUB
BRS-DUB
CWL-DUB
EDI-DUB
LGW-DUB
LBA-DUB
LPL-DUB
LTN-BGY
LTN-DUB
MAN-DUB
MME-DUB
NCL-DUB
PIK-BVA
PIK-CRL
PIK-DUB
PIK-GRO
PIK-NYO
STN-EGC
STN-SXF
STN-LRH
STN-LIG
STN-PIS

Max
149.99
159.99
159.99
159.99
169.99
149.99
169.99
169.99
249.99
149.99
189.99
159.99
179.99
159.99
139.99
159.99
199.99
159.99
189.99
149.99
189.99
189.99
189.99

Median
149.99
149.99
149.99
149.99
149.99
139.99
149.99
159.99
159.99
139.99
179.99
149.99
169.99
139.99
129.99
149.99
189.99
139.99
179.99
149.99
169.99
179.99
179.99

Mode
149.99
149.99
149.99
149.99
149.99
139.99
149.99
159.99
159.99
139.99
179.99
149.99
169.99
139.99
129.99
149.99
189.99
139.99
179.99
149.99
169.99
179.99
179.99

Mean
143.5
148.1
146.9
144.1
144.9
136.9
146.9
156.8
159.9
137.0
176.3
145.1
166.1
140.6
128.4
145.4
177.2
125.9
175.9
140.9
160.9
174.2
172.5

S.D.
25.5
21.8
19.7
23.2
22.5
16.9
21.7
20.9
44.9
17.3
24.4
23.0
24.5
19.4
22.1
23.7
37.6
37.3
25.2
28.4
30.1
27.3
32.0

Route
STN-CCF
STN-NOC
STN-DUB
STN-EIN
STN-FRL
STN-GOA
STN-GRO
STN-GSE
STN-HHN
STN-HAU
STN-LBC
STN-MMX
STN-MPL
STN-MJV
STN-AOI
STN-VBS
STN-VLL
STN-PSA
STN-PIK
STN-CIA
STN-REU
STN-PUF
STN-PGF

Max
199.99
189.99
149.99
139.99
199.99
189.99
199.99
189.99
159.99
169.99
139.99
169.99
199.99
199.99
179.99
179.99
199.99
209.99
149.99
209.99
199.99
189.99
199.99

Median
169.99
169.99
139.99
139.99
199.99
169.99
189.99
179.99
145.99
169.99
139.99
159.99
189.99
179.99
149.99
129.99
189.99
189.99
129.99
199.99
189.99
179.99
169.99

Mode
169.99
169.99
139.99
139.99
199.99
169.99
189.99
179.99
145.99
169.99
139.99
159.99
189.99
179.99
149.99
129.99
189.99
189.99
129.99
199.99
189.99
179.99
169.99

Mean
162.4
157.5
134.8
134.9
185.8
163.6
168.8
170.7
139.9
157.4
130.3
147.1
172.7
150.6
151.1
133.9
171.5
181.3
119.6
187.0
163.0
156.2
164.8

S.D.
26.6
27.6
22.8
21.1
37.4
30.7
46.8
35.8
23.9
39.0
31.8
39.7
30.6
43.5
24.7
45.9
25.9
28.9
44.4
52.7
37.9
26.9

Note: The Table includes a selection of routes with more than 1000 observations in our estimation sample of flights with less than 50 seats
available.
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Table 2: Distribution of F are1, by route and flight occupancy.
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Route
BLK-DUB
BHX-DUB
BRS-DUB
CWL-DUB
EDI-DUB
LGW-DUB
LBA-DUB
LPL-DUB
LTN-BGY
LTN-DUB
MAN-DUB
MME-DUB
NCL-DUB
PIK-BVA
PIK-CRL
PIK-DUB
PIK-GRO
PIK-NYO
STN-EGC
STN-SXF
STN-LRH
STN-LIG
STN-PIS

Available Seats
Less than 50
50 or more
Max Mean
Max Mean
149.99 48.00 119.99 10.29
159.99 62.95 109.90 18.23
159.99 62.87 119.99 18.63
159.99 56.01 109.90 22.26
169.99 67.06 129.90 16.72
144.99 55.89 104.99 19.09
169.99 56.93 149.99 16.48
169.99 60.81 139.99 13.55
249.99 78.63 179.99 22.53
139.99 55.55
99.99 14.23
189.99 61.08 149.90 10.82
159.99 48.89 119.99 13.95
179.99 60.83 139.99 20.08
159.99 55.07 109.99 22.59
139.99 49.66
89.99 17.15
149.99 61.12 149.99 11.31
189.99 79.75 189.90 50.55
159.99 69.73
79.99 17.29
189.99 81.47 179.90 31.77
149.99 62.63 149.99 18.99
189.99 69.58 109.99 29.47
189.99 75.64 149.99 25.81
189.99 65.72 149.99 24.23

Route
STN-CCF
STN-NOC
STN-DUB
STN-EIN
STN-FRL
STN-GOA
STN-GRO
STN-GSE
STN-HHN
STN-HAU
STN-LBC
STN-MMX
STN-MPL
STN-MJV
STN-AOI
STN-VBS
STN-VLL
STN-PSA
STN-PIK
STN-CIA
STN-REU
STN-PUF
STN-PGF

Available Seats
Less than 50
50 or more
Max Mean
Max Mean
199.99 69.25 149.90 26.38
189.99 75.46 139.99 37.14
144.99 49.52 119.99 15.31
139.99 60.54
99.99
9.46
199.99 71.64 139.99 16.60
189.99 72.79 149.90 14.78
199.99 74.26 159.90 22.72
189.99 91.54 179.90 24.51
159.99 59.37
85.99 12.80
169.99 53.42 169.99 16.03
139.99 62.88 139.99 13.55
169.90 66.82 129.99 16.16
199.99 77.35 159.90 25.55
199.99 87.82 159.90 54.73
179.99 72.73 139.90 25.53
179.90 58.25 129.99 18.55
189.99 73.80 159.99 19.09
189.99 90.56 169.99 32.28
149.99 48.77
89.99
9.29
199.99 66.83 139.90 19.98
199.99 67.04 139.99 20.99
179.99 65.43 129.90 23.11
199.99 75.46 159.99 25.75

Note: The Table includes a selection of routes with more than 1000 observations in our estimation sample.
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Table 3: Mean Fare1 by available seats and booking day
Booking
Day
1
4
7
10
14
21
28
35
42
49-70
Total

1-9
125.5
114.3
110.9
109.3
106.4
116.4
130.9
135.6
128.0
124.5
116.9

10-19
95.4
75.3
69.5
68.8
72.5
82.1
92.9
97.6
97.9
107.4
78.6

Available Seats
20-29 30-39 40-49
83.7
78
74.2
57.8
49.4
43.6
49.1
37.9
31.1
48.2
37.7
31.3
48.1
35.9
28.0
56.2
41.8
32.7
64.3
47.0
36.9
71.3
53.0
41.9
74.9
57.1
49.4
88.6
66.1
54.9
58.8
47.1
39.5

≥50
64.3
36.1
19.4
19.7
13.5
15.4
16.5
17.3
18.0
18.4
20.0

Total
84.5
57.2
40.6
36.3
27.3
24.1
21.6
20.4
20.0
19.3
31.1

Note: Fare1 is the fare obtained from a query for one seat.

Table 4: Percentage mean of observations with a price drop in Fare1 of at least £5.00
between two consecutive booking periods.
Booking
Period
4-1
7-4
10-7
14-10
21-14
28-21
35-28
42-35
49-42
63-49
Total
N

1-9
0.04
0.05
0.07
0.09
0.14
0.09
0.10
0.06
0.09
0.02
0.06
22,434

Available seats
10-19
20-29
30-39
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.09
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.15
0.16
0.19
0.13
0.13
0.16
0.11
0.13
0.15
0.06
0.12
0.15
0.14
0.10
0.14
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.08
0.09
0.11
30,147 30,973 31,363

40-49
0.02
0.04
0.09
0.10
0.21
0.19
0.18
0.14
0.14
0.13
0.13
30,456

Total
0.02
0.05
0.09
0.10
0.18
0.16
0.15
0.13
0.13
0.11
0.09

N
26,632
26,281
24,904
22,340
18,382
11,899
6,717
3,691
2,107
2,420
145,373

Note: Fare1 is the fare obtained from a query for one seat. The price drop is calculated conditional on the
number of available seats being less than 50 and non-increasing between two consecutive periods.
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Table 5: Fare changes between two consecutive booking periods when flight occupancy
remains unchanged. (Percentage values), by flight characteristics.

Average Change in £
Available Seats > 20
Available Seats <= 20
Booking Day > 14
Booking Day <= 14
Winter
Summer
High Competition
Low Competition
N
N

(%
(%
(%
(%
(%
(%
(%
(%
(%

row)
row)
row)
row)
row)
row)
row)
row)
row)

Large
Drop
-46.21
3.94
3.63
5.49
3.46
5.37
3.06
2.88
5.20
3.75
392

Moderate
Drop
-12.45
6.45
4.13
8.89
4.39
5.50
4.85
4.83
5.40
5.05
527

Fare Change
No Moderate
Change
Increase
0
14.27
64.98
13.09
78.19
5.68
74.56
6.61
72.68
8.96
70.25
8.88
74.11
8.51
74.89
7.93
69.77
9.76
72.96
8.62
7,618
900

Large
Increase
49.78
11.54
8.36
4.45
10.51
10.00
9.46
9.47
9.88
9.62
1,005

N

4,141
6,301
1,529
8,913
3,129
7,313
6,496
3,946
10,442

Note: Large (Moderate) increases/drops refer to changes strictly greater than (smaller than) £20.0 in
absolute terms.
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Table 6: Tobit and First Stage estimates. Dependent Variable: Sold Seats
L-FW mean ∆ F are
Booking Day1
Booking Day4
Booking Day7
Booking Day10
Booking Day14
Booking Day21
Booking Day28
Booking Day35
Booking Day42
Booking Day49
Booking Day56
Booking Day63
N. UK airports
serving arrival

Tobit
0.180 (0.004)∗∗∗
69.178 (0.678)∗∗∗
62.310 (0.691)∗∗∗
55.925 (0.700)∗∗∗
50.632 (0.699)∗∗∗
43.823 (0.704)∗∗∗
33.374 (0.692)∗∗∗
24.537 (0.684)∗∗∗
16.910 (0.671)∗∗∗
10.702 (0.661)∗∗∗
6.218 (0.658)∗∗∗
3.552 (0.653)∗∗∗
3.088 (0.578)∗∗∗
-1.255

112.274

0.908

(0.002)∗∗∗

-0.200

(0.028)∗∗∗

(0.195)∗∗∗

Tobit residual
Booking Day is in
Holiday period
Constant
DUMMIES:
Month booking
Week
Route
DOW Booking
Time Departure
Number of obs.
Pseudo R2
Test excluded instruments:
Underidentification
K-P LM Test

0.163
66.025
59.202
53.201
47.730
41.380
31.282
22.842
15.603
9.822
5.751
3.254
2.830

First stage
(0.000)∗∗∗
(0.122)∗∗∗
(0.119)∗∗∗
(0.12)∗∗∗
(0.119)∗∗∗
(0.117)∗∗∗
(0.115)∗∗∗
(0.113)∗∗∗
(0.111)∗∗∗
(0.103)∗∗∗
(0.098)∗∗∗
(0.091)∗∗∗
(0.087)∗∗∗

(5.419)∗∗∗

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
547,543
0.1663

Yes
No
No
No
No
113,535
0.9674
F (2, 4652) = 67344.48∗∗∗
χ2 (2)=1676.50∗∗∗
F (2, 4652)= 488.43∗∗∗
χ2 (2)=977.29∗∗∗
χ2 (2)=580.76∗∗∗

Anderson-Rubin Wald test
Anderson-Rubin Wald test
Stock-Wright LM S statistic

Note: “Top Fare” denotes the fare obtained by using the highest possible number of seats in a query.
∆F are = T op F are − F are1, where Fare1 is the fare for one seat. The means are obtained by taking their
7 and 14 days lagged (L) and forward (FW) values. Coefficients
and

∗

∗∗∗

statistically significant at 1%,

∗∗

at 5%

at 10%. K-P=Kleibergen-Paap.
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Table 7: Pricing equation results using the full sample and different estimation methods.
Dependent Variable: LnFare1
Sold seats
Booking Day1
Booking Day4
Booking Day7
Booking Day10
Booking Day14
Booking Day21
Booking Day28
Booking Day35
Booking Day42
Booking Day48
Booking Day56
Booking Day63
Tobit residual
DUMMIES:
Month booking
Number of obs.
Centered R2
Excluded instruments:
Underidentification
K-P LM Test
Hansen J statistic

IVFE
0.0256 (0.001)∗∗∗
0.7630 (0.051)∗∗∗
0.4577 (0.05)∗∗∗
0.2171 (0.047)∗∗∗
0.1642 (0.046)∗∗∗
-0.0096 (0.043)
-0.0191 (0.04)
0.0020 (0.037)
0.0085 (0.036)
-0.0162 (0.037)
-0.0108 (0.036)
-0.0068 (0.037)
0.0081 (0.038)
0.0046 (0.000)∗∗∗

FE-OLS
0.0309 (0.001)∗∗∗
0.4578 (0.049)∗∗∗
0.1716 (0.047)∗∗∗
-0.0451 (0.045)
-0.0712 (0.044)
-0.2143 (0.042)∗∗∗
-0.1716 (0.039)∗∗∗
-0.1079 (0.037)∗∗∗
-0.0652 (0.037)*
-0.0614 (0.036)*
-0.0374 (0.036)
-0.0211 (0.038)
-0.0039 (0.035)
0.0012 (0.000)∗∗∗

YES
113,535
0.5688
2

YES
113,535
0.5697

χ2 (2) = 1676.50∗∗∗
χ2 (1) = 1.962

Note: Fare1 is the fare obtained from a query for one seat. Bootstrap Standard Errors (SE) are reported
in parenthesis, clustered by route and week. 250 repetitions. Coefficients
∗∗

at 5% and

∗

∗∗∗

statistically significant at 1%,

at 10%. K-P=Kleibergen-Paap.
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Table 8: Pricing equation results in flights that filled up early, i.e., that had less than 30
seats available 14 days before their departure. Dependent Variable: LnFare1

Sold seats
Booking Day1
Booking Day4
Booking Day7
Booking Day10
Booking Day14
Booking Day21
Booking Day28
Booking Day35
Booking Day42
Booking Day48
Booking Day56
Booking Day63
Tobit residual
DUMMIES:
Month booking
Number of obs.
Centered R2
Excluded instruments:
Underidentification
K-P LM Test

Less than 30
final left seats
0.0264 (0.001)∗∗∗
0.5405 (0.067)∗∗∗
0.3601 (0.063)∗∗∗
0.2202 (0.06)∗∗∗
0.1021 (0.058)*
-0.0714 (0.055)
-0.1408 (0.048)∗∗∗
-0.0998 (0.042)**
-0.0810 (0.038)**
-0.0801 (0.038)**
-0.0310 (0.037)
-0.0255 (0.039)
-0.0101 (0.038)
0.0017 (0.001)∗∗∗

Less than 15
final left seats
0.0273 (0.001)∗∗∗
0.4361 (0.074)∗∗∗
0.2664 (0.07)∗∗∗
0.1239 (0.067)*
0.0015 (0.064)
-0.1753 (0.06)∗∗∗
-0.2262 (0.053)∗∗∗
-0.1707 (0.049)∗∗∗
-0.1412 (0.044)∗∗∗
-0.1262 (0.041)∗∗∗
-0.0774 (0.039)**
-0.0573 (0.041)
-0.0361 (0.049)
0.0017 (0.001)∗∗

Yes
42,814
0.5468
2

Yes
36,222
0.5601
2

χ2 (2) =986.96∗∗∗

Hansen J statistic

χ2 (2)=0.753

χ2 (2)=907.23∗∗
χ2 (2)=0.781

Note: The two samples are built by selecting all the observations for those flights whose lowest number of
available seats was, respectively, less than 30 and less than 15. In both samples, flights had less than 30
seats available 14 days prior to departure. Fare1 is the fare obtained from a query for one seat. Bootstrap
Standard Errors (SE) are reported in parenthesis, clustered by route and week. 250 repetitions. Coefficients
∗∗∗

statistically significant at 1%,

∗∗

at 5% and

∗

at 10%. K-P=Kleibergen-Paap.
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Table 9: Pricing equation results in flights that had at least 30 seats or more available 14
days before their departure. Dependent Variable: LnFare1

Sold seats
Booking Day1
Booking Day4
Booking Day7
Booking Day10
Booking Day14
Booking Day21
Booking Day28
Booking Day35
Booking Day42
Booking Day48
Booking Day56
Booking Day63
Tobit residual
DUMMIES:
Month booking
Number of obs
Centered R2
Underidentification
K-P LM Test
Hansen J statistic

Less than 30
final left seats
0.0250 (0.001)∗∗∗
0.6936 (0.126)∗∗∗
0.3736 (0.124)∗∗∗
0.0926 (0.122)
0.0577 (0.122)
-0.1270 (0.12)
0.0059 (0.116)
0.0730 (0.117)
0.1397 (0.112)
0.1026 (0.114)
0.0105 (0.124)
0.0211 (0.133)
0.0570 (0.122)
0.0063 (0.001)∗∗∗

Less than 15
final left seats
0.0243 (0.001)∗∗∗
0.6224 (0.183)∗∗∗
0.3138 (0.181)∗∗∗
0.0016 (0.179)
-0.0567 (0.175)
-0.1380 (0.173)
-0.0071 (0.167)
0.0669 (0.167)
0.1517 (0.165)
0.1254 (0.169)
0.1308 (0.173)
0.1408 (0.172)
0.2086 (0.166)
0.0047 (0.001)∗∗∗

Yes
52,778
0.5822

Yes
25,865
0.6494

χ2 (2) =1435.2∗∗∗
χ2 (2)=0.001

χ2 (2)=1012.2∗∗
χ2 (2)=0.110

Note: The two samples are built by selecting all the observations for those flights whose lowest number of
available seats was, respectively, i) less than 30; ii) less than 15. In both samples, flights had more than 30
seats available 14 days prior to departure. Fare1 is the fare obtained from a query for one seat. Bootstrap
Standard Errors (SE) are reported in parenthesis, clustered by route and week. 250 repetitions. Coefficients
∗∗∗

statistically significant at 1%,

∗∗

at 5% and

∗

at 10%. K-P=Kleibergen-Paap.
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Table 10: Pricing equation results by time of the day and season. Dependent Variable: LnFare1

35

Sold seats
Booking Day1
Booking Day4
Booking Day7
Booking Day10
Booking Day14
Booking Day21
Booking Day28
Booking Day35
Booking Day42
Booking Day48
Booking Day56
Booking Day63
Tobit residual
DUMMIES:
Month booking
Number of obs.
Centered R2
Underidentification
K-P LM Test
Hansen J statistic

Morning
0.0250 (0.001)∗∗∗
0.9558 (0.095)∗∗∗
0.6410 (0.092)∗∗∗
0.3549 (0.089)∗∗∗
0.2924 (0.085)∗∗∗
0.0888 (0.081)
0.0513 (0.075)
0.0605 (0.07)
0.1003 (0.069)
0.0671 (0.067)
0.0390 (0.069)
0.0657 (0.067)
0.0584 (0.072)
0.0063 (0.001)∗∗∗

Evening
0.0274 (0.001)∗∗∗
0.7716 (0.09)∗∗∗
0.4931 (0.087)∗∗∗
0.2959 (0.083)∗∗∗
0.2454 (0.079)∗∗∗
0.0995 (0.073)
0.0706 (0.065)
0.0636 (0.057)
0.0532 (0.055)
-0.0297 (0.054)
0.0413 (0.048)
-0.0017 (0.055)
0.0178 (0.048)
0.0034 (0.001)∗∗∗

Winter
0.0236 (0.001)∗∗∗
1.0537 (0.132)∗∗∗
0.6924 (0.128)∗∗∗
0.374 (0.125)∗∗∗
0.2696 (0.123)∗∗
0.0756 (0.118)
-0.0232 (0.112)
0.0006 (0.107)
0.0059 (0.107)
-0.1101 (0.103)
-0.173 (0.108)
-0.2762 (0.109)**
-0.104 (0.114)
0.0236 (0.001)∗∗∗

Summer
0.0253 (0.001)∗∗∗
0.5724 (0.061)∗∗∗
0.2942 (0.058)∗∗∗
0.0863 (0.056)
0.0538 (0.053)
-0.1198 (0.050)**
-0.1113 (0.046)**
-0.1008 (0.041)**
-0.0949 (0.038)**
-0.0868 (0.038)**
-0.0653 (0.038)*
-0.029 (0.033)
-0.0055 (0.038)
0.0057 (0.001)∗∗∗

YES
44,403
0.590

YES
30,807
0.574

YES
37,504
0.560

YES
76,031
0.580

χ2 (2)=936.9∗∗∗
χ2 (2)=0.002

χ2 (2)=753.1∗∗∗
χ2 (2)=1.090

χ2 (2) =661.1∗∗∗

χ2 (2)=1047.4∗∗∗

χ2 (2)=0.454

χ2 (2)=0.001

Note: Morning=6am-11am; Evening=4pm-10.15pm. Winter= Nov-Mar; Summer= Apr-Oct. Bootstrap Standard Errors (SE) are reported
in parenthesis, clustered by route and week. 250 repetitions. Coefficients

∗∗∗

statistically significant at 1%,

∗∗

at 5% and

∗

at 10%. K-

P=Kleibergen-Paap.
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Table 11: Pricing equation results in Short and Medium Haul routes with Low and High Competition. Dependent
Variable: LnFare1
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Sold seats
Booking Day1
Booking Day4
Booking Day7
Booking Day10
Booking Day14
Booking Day21
Booking Day28
Booking Day35
Booking Day42
Booking Day48
Booking Day56
Booking Day63
Tobit residual
DUMMIES:
Month booking
Number of obs.
Centered R2
Underidentification
K-P LM Test
Hansen J statistic

Short Haul
0.0282 (0.001)***
0.7532 (0.091)***
0.4179 (0.089)***
0.1335 (0.086)
0.0667 (0.083)
-0.1571 (0.079)**
-0.1679 (0.074)**
-0.1181 (0.069)*
-0.008 (0.066)
-0.0095 (0.066)
-0.0301 (0.067)
-0.0449 (0.075)
-0.0047 (0.072)
0.0047 (0.001)***

Medium Haul
0.0253 (0.001)***
0.6481 (0.064)***
0.3515 (0.061)***
0.1558 (0.058)***
0.1219 (0.055)**
-0.0004 (0.051)
0.0020 (0.046)
0.0220 (0.042)
-0.0146 (0.04)
-0.0482 (0.039)
-0.0093 (0.039)
-0.0043 (0.04)
0.0015 (0.042)
0.0016 (0.001)**

Low Competition
0.0281 (0.001)***
0.6621 (0.086)***
0.3837 (0.082)***
0.1523 (0.08)*
0.1153 (0.077)
-0.0494 (0.075)
-0.0249 (0.069)
0.0109 (0.065)
0.0195 (0.063)
0.0204 (0.061)
0.0138 (0.061)
-0.0509 (0.068)
0.0316 (0.064)
0.0035 (0.001)***

High Competition
0.024 (0.001)***
0.8217 (0.066)***
0.4981 (0.064)***
0.251 (0.061)***
0.1867 (0.057)***
0.0074 (0.055)
-0.0258 (0.048)
-0.013 (0.043)
-0.0023 (0.042)
-0.0464 (0.042)
-0.0309 (0.041)
0.021 (0.04)
-0.0088 (0.043)
0.0052 (0.001)***

YES
43,496
0.646

YES
59,661
0.512

YES
46,934
0.550

YES
66,601
0.584

χ2 (2) = 615.1∗∗∗

χ2 (2) = 870.8∗∗∗

χ2 (2) = 947.6∗∗∗

χ2 (2) = 857.8∗∗∗

χ2 (1) = 1.953

χ2 (1) = 0.312

χ2 (1) = 0.961

χ2 (1) = 0.808

Note: Fare1 is the fare obtained from a query for one seat. Short (Medium) Haul routes are less than 370 (more than 500) miles long. Low
Competition includes flights in routes/city-pairs where Ryanair is at most a duopolist. In High Competition Ryanair operates with two or
more other carriers at either the route or the city-pair level. Bootstrap Standard Errors (SE) are reported in parenthesis, clustered by route
and week. 250 repetitions. Coefficients
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∗∗∗

statistically significant at 1%,

∗∗

at 5% and

∗

at 10%. K-P=Kleibergen-Paap.
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Figure 1: Median Spline of F are1 and sold seats, by timetable season.
Route: London Gatwick - Dublin. Each line refers to a different flight code, defined in the legenda.
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Figure 2: Non parametric fit of LnF are1 and sold seats, by timetable season.
Route: London Gatwick - Dublin. Each line refers to a different flight code, defined in the legenda.
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Figure 3: Non parametric fit between percentage deviation from mean F are1 and percentage deviation from mean occupancy.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Sold Seats in morning and evening flights.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Fares in morning and evening flights.
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